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Trade and Financial Interdependence
Under Flexible Exchange Rates: The Pacific Area
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses policy interdependence under flexible exchange
rates and its implications for middle-income countries in the Pacific
area. In the first part of the paper, the consequences of strategic
behavior among industrial countries are illustrated by means of a simple
diagram. It is argued that in the absence of incentives to coordinate
macroeconomic policies among major countries, exchange rates will tend
to be volatile. Evidence on the world value of the dollar in the
flexible rate period is then presented and interpreted.
The second part describes exchange.rate policies in the Pacific
area. It is found that the widespread policy of pegging to the U.S.
dollar has implied occasional large devaluations against the numeraire
(Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia). An alternative,
which requires higher Pacific trade and financial interdependence than
the one prevailing during the last decade, would be a joint float along
the lines of the policies seemingly pursued by Malaysia and Singapore.
The two-country macroeconomic model presented in the Appendix
can be used to assess the costs and benefits of policy coordination both
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INTRODUCTION
The performance of the world economy in the last ten years has been
very uneven. In industrial countries, growth was much slower than
expected: it fell from 5% per annum in 1960—73 to about 2% in 1973-82.
The slowdown was less brutal in developing countries, where the rate fell
from 6% to 4½% between the two periods. Among those, the ones in the
Pacific area managed to sustain an annual rate of growth of 7½%, close to
the high rate of 8% they recorded in the previous period. Nevertheless,
if policies in industrial countries continue to be contractionary, or if
major exchange rates continue to be volatile, it will be harder to
sustain Pacific growth without a substantial increase in trade and
financial interdependence among the middle-income countries of the
1
region.
Expectations of self-sustained fast and stable growth in the OECD
area had been formed during the so-called the post-war "belle epoque".
For twenty-five years, macroeconomic policies preserved full employment
and reasonable price inflation at home while allowing for a rapid
expansion of international trade and capital movements. Judged by this
standard, the performance of the last decade has generated the belief
that Atlantic prosperity is over. In the process, skepticism about the
effectiveness of national macroeconomic policies in restoring full
employment without inflation, or in reducing inflation without unemploy-
ment, became widespread.
The volatile policy environment of recent years reflects this
skepticism: high trade and financial interdependence implies conflicts-4-
between national policy objectives and gives rise to strategic behavior
by national actors, whose outcome may be inefficient. In the seventies,
these conflicts were exacerbated by the oil shocks. In the early
eighties, the rise of the dollar also had the effect of a global shock.
Moreover, when there are shared instruments, such as the exchange rate,
which are very sensitive to expectations about the future, signals of the
lack of credibility of a particular macroeconomic policy package become
evident in the foreign exchange market. To offset these signals requires
a high degree of international policy coordination.
In the absence of conflicts among national policy objectives,
expectations about the future would be lessvolatile. Intentions of
international policy coordination would then become credible and, as a
consequence, a fixed exchange rate regime, such as the one which
prevailed during the post-war "belle epoque", could be enforced. If the
exchange rate between major currencies were fixed, on the other hand,
macroeconomic policy in smaller countries might be facilitated.
Even though international policy coordination would support a fixed
exchange rate system, there is no incentive to coordinate. Because each
one of the countries would be better-off if the other country initiated
monetary expansion, an explicit agreement, monitored by an international
organization, would be required toenfórce the coordinated expansion in
the two countries. The task would clearly be more difficult if the
coordination was to be achieved among a large number of countries, or if
the two countries were not similar.
The design and implementation of a comprehensive recovery program
among industrial countries would also have to imply that expectations of
future changes in exchange rates settle at some "equilibrium" value.-5-
Otherwise expectations would remain volatile and so would exchange rates
and competitiveness. Credible government intervention in the foreign
exchange market to limit exchange rate volatility would surely be
desirable. However, it would involve operations of a scale which does
not seem viable under the present international order. The degree of
international monitoring required may even raise fundamental value
judgements about the sovereignty of nation-states.
The slowdown of inflation cannot induce a worldwide recovery of
private economic activity which is expected to last, as it did during the
post—war "belle epoque", until macroeconomic policies of major countries
are not better coordinated, both internally and internationally.2
Furthermore, the substantial fiscal inbalance between the United States
and other OECD countries is likely to call for a serious macroeconomic
adjustment in the years to come, and this will be reflected in the world
value of the dollar.
In the meantime, the skepticism about the effectiveness of central
bank intervention policies need not be a reason for undue pessimism about
the sustainability of world economic recovery. Indeed, the rise of stock
market prices in major industrial countries in early 1983, the concerted
steps to deal with the "external debt problem" without a major financial
crisis, and the strong recovery of the United States allow for some
optimism.
The paper is organized into two Sections. First, a theoretical
assessment of the different outcomes of a policy interdependence game
between two similar (industrial) countries linked by international trade
and high capital mobility is presented. The results are expressed as
deviations from a long run equilibrium where expectations are fully-6-
realized. They are followed by a quantitative explanation of the world
value of the U.S. dollar in the last ten years, which, instead, gives a
large weight to the volatility of expectations about the long run
fundamental determinants of the international competitiveness of U.S.
products.
The implications of the contractionary bias implied by strategic
behavior in industrial countries and of the volatility in major exchange
rates for the middle-income countries in the Pacific area are assessed in
Section II. Exchange rate policies in several of these countries reveal
a benign pegging to the U.S. dollar, which contrasts both with the
fervent experimentation prevailing in the Southern Cone of America and
with the tradition of currency unions encountered in West Africa. This
neglect of the volatility of the dollar explains why, in the last few
years, some countries changed the peg by means of sharp devaluations.
These have hindered regional trade and financial interdependence, thereby
increasing the vulnerability of the Pacific area to policy games played
elsewhere. The consequences of policy coordination in the area along the
lines of a "joint float" are taken up in the conclusion.—7—
I.POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE UNDER FLEXIBLE RATES
The ideathat macroeconomic policies would become increasingly
ineffective if they did not recognize the increased interdependence among
nation-states was put forth in the late sixties, in the context of the
North Atlantic area. It has been widely discussed among economists and
political scientists since then, and the world teinterdependence? has also
been prominent in national and international policy debates.3
Furthermore, historians have used the notion of a "world-system" in
discussions not only of the 19th century but also of earlier periods. A
?tworld_systemt? is based on a network of channels of trade and financial
interdependence among countries and implies reciprocal constraints on the
attainment of their domestic macroeconomic policy objectives. These
constraints, which might be codified into explicit international rules or
agreements, also apply to the periphery of the system where the
reciprocity of interdependence is absent.
The very popularity of the term interdependence suggests several
meanings. The most relevant for macroeconomic policy pertains to the
leakage abroad of a particular measure. One countryt s policy has effects
on another country which in turn have repercussions on the first country
and vice-versa. If interdependence increases, the effect of the policy
on the output of the initiating country tends to be smaller and the
4
output effect abroad tends to be larger.
When prices are allowed to vary, macroeconomic disturbances will
change not only output but also the terms of trade. Since these refer
both to the competitiveness of domestic versus foreign goods -measured—8—
by the real exchange rate -andto the relative price of consumption and
saving -measuredby the real interest rate -, tradeand financial
interdependence crucially affect the transmission mechanism. Capital
flows ensure that the return on foreign assets (in domesticcurrency)
equals the return on domestic assets, at least in the absence of exchange
controls as well as of risk-aversion on the part of international
investors. By assuming that this arbitrage condition holds,we overstate
the constraints implied by financial interdependence. This is
appropriate for a discussion of Atlantic policy interdependence, where
financial flows are hardly controled, but should be qualified in
discussing Pacific issues. In any event, the relative strength of the
effects of monetary policy on exchange rates and interest rates is
crucial for the outcome of the policy game analyzed below.
In the late sixties, international economists werevirtually
unanimous in claiming that exchange rate flexibility would insulate
national economies from each other, thus allowinggreater macroeconomic
control of interdependence. With volatility of major exchange rates
becoming a central feature of world financial markets in the last ten
years, unanImity disappeared. Certainly, volatility has not been as
detrimental to international trade and payments as some feared but, -
becauseof slower adjustment in goods markets, it has generated farmore
variation in the relative price of national outputs than would be called
for by underlying demand and supply disturbances.
The prevailing skepticism about the effectiveness of central bank
intervention in large, well organized foreign exchange marketssuggests
that exchange rate volatility in the lasttenyears has derived from
problems of credibility of national government policy.5 The stance of-9-
the U.S. administration, on the other hand, may be related to the special
role of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary system.
1. Strategic Behavior in Industrial Countries
Even in a theoretical world of two symmetric interdependent
economies, conflicts of national policy objectives imply a flexible
exchange rate system. The reason is that these conflicts tend to be
solved by non-cooperative methods.6 If the monetary authorities were to
cooperate, they would jointly try to reduce inflation and unemployment
and the solution would be efficient for both countries. Because there is
no reason for either country to believe that the other country will
cooperate, this solution will not arise spontaneously. A credible rule
or agreement monitored by an international agency, will be necessary to
enforce cooperation. If the two countries are identical, this
cooperative solution will support a fixed exchange rate.
In the absence of an international monitoring agency, the two
monetary authorities will not behave cooperatively. Instead, they each
will try to attain the domestic objective, based on an anticipation of
the other country's policy response. This outcome will be inferior to
the cooperative outcome, as it involves a social loss arising from the
inefficient allocation of resources.
If only one country -theleader -correctlyanticipates the other
country's response, however, the outcome will be asymmetric. Even if the
two countries gain, the leader gains proportionately less than the
follower. Furthermore, if the two countries are identical, there is no
economic reason for either one to act as leader and therefore the-10-
spontaneous outcome will be the symmetric non-cooperative solution, which
is the one where both countries are worse-off. These theoretical
possibilities are consistent with the observed reluctance of major
industrial countries to act as leaders, or "locomotives", even though
they advocate cooperation.
To illustrate the framework, consider the case where the price of
domes-tic output is rigid in both countries. Then the cooperative
solution succeeds in eliminating unemployment, while monetaryexpansion
sustains a fixed exchange rate and the same inflation in both countries.
If each country tries to lower inflation by appreciating thecurrency,
neither one succeeds in eliminating unemployment. This outcomehinges on
the dominance of interest rate effects onmoney demand rather than on
investment as well as on large trade elasticities. It is therefore the
appropriate one to focus on when the consequences of trade and financial
interdependence must be assessed. Furthermore, in this setup, the leader
will overexpand knowing that the follower will appreciate thecurrency.
This appreciation lowers inflation while the leader's expansion reduces
unemployment, so that the gains of the follower are greater than the
gains of the leader. Therefore, both will be reluctant to take
initiative and remain at the relatively less desirable symmetric
non-cooperative point.
This example is illustrated in Figure 1. Taking the log-linear
two-country macromodel described in the Appendix and assuming that the
authorities are minimizing the deviations of output and the price level
from their steady-state values, we can define the loss contours in the
space of the single instrument available in each country, the money
stock, m and m*. By normalization, we choose as the origin the— lOa—
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cooperative solution where the monetary expansion accomodates the price
rigidity (point C in Figure 1). This yields a common loss cLcL*
Since all other solutions shown involve lower money stock, the direction
of the axis is reversed. The straight lines RR and R*R* are the loci of
the reactiàn functions of the domestic and foreign country, respectively.
Their intersection denotes the non-cooperative outcome, labelled N, where
loss is greatest NL =NL*At that point, though, the money stocks
remain equal so that the exchange rate does not move. If the home
country acts as a leader, the outcome is preferable for both SL >NLand
SL* >NL*However, the home country would prefer to be a follower since
SL >SL*and similarly for the foreign country SL* >Sr
A fixed exchange rate agreement, forcing the solution to be on the
450 line, would prevent the two countries from reaching N or, for that
matter, S or S*, since at those points the exchange rate will have to
change. The problem is how to make a commitment to fix the exchange rate
credible, since there would be incentives for each country to wait for
the other country to expand and be the "locomotive". An international
agreement such as the one underlying the Bretton-Woods system, monitored
by an international organization, would be needed to solve the problem,
even in a two-country world. Even if such agreement existed, though, the
mere expectation of exchange rate changes would generate incentives to
depreciate or appreciate the currency and undermine the credibility of
the system.
Note finally that the unemployment which is associated with the
non-cooperative solution would, in the absence of other shocks, imply
over time a lower rate of inflation so that, in the long run, it might be
preferable to the more inflationary cooperative solution.7 This is-12-
related to the neglect of internal cooperation, and requires a dynamic
analysis where expectations adjust, like the one underlying the
discussion o follow.
Nevertheless, it can be said that the qualitative analysis of the
prospects for world recovery based on the strategic interaction of two
symmetric economies is consistent with the protracted stagflation in the
OECD area, to the extent that the interest rate effects of monetary
policy have dominated. This has constrained recovery in industrial
countries and, as mentioned, a sustainable OECD recovery is necessary -
butperhaps not sufficient -forsustainable growth in the Pacific as
well as for economic recovery in the world at large.
2. The volatility of expectations and the world value of the dollar
As shown in Table 1 below, the dollar exchange rates of major
currencies have been quite volatile. To obtain an indicator of the world
value of the dollar, we average major bilateral exchange rates in
proportion to the country's gross domestic product in dollars
(multilateral weights).8 In the last ten years, this indicator shows a
phase of relative stability prevailing from 1973 to early 1976; a phase
of devaluation extending until mid-1980; and a phase of steep
appreciation continuing until the present.
Due to the stability of relative inflation rates, the variations in
the nominal effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar have been matched
almost exactly by variations in its real exchange rate. Goods price
arbitrage was therefore very weak.-13-
In a large well-organized speculative market, asset price or
intertemporal arbitrage ensures that actual exchange rates equal their
discounted expected equilibrium values. For example, in the presence of
inflationary expectations, a positive real differential of 5 per cent
per annuminthe U.S. will be associated with an equal expected real
appreciation of the dollar. Unlike relative goods prices, real interest
differentials do seem to be correlated with the exchange rate.
Nevertheless, only one fourth of the quarterly volatility of the nominal
exchange rate of the dollar from 1973 to 1982 can be explained by
intertemporal arbitrage.
In sum, the real exchange rate today will differ from the real
exchange rate yesterday due to the change in the real interest differen-
tial and to the change in expectations about the equilibrium real
exchange rate. If these are taken as given, exchange rate movements can
be captured by arbitrage conditions.9
But expectations about the equilibrium real exchange rate cannot be
taken as given. Information on which they are based varies, sometimes
dramatically, from day to day. These changes are not only due to changes
in the fundamental determinants, but also to the existence, recognized by
market participants, of some probability of a sudden return to the
equilibrium value. SImilarly, the belief in a change in policy regime,
even if it is erroneous, can be a source of changes in expectations,
which will be all the more important in an unstable environment.10 A
rough way of embodying the influences of changes in expectations, or
"news", about the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is to take the
residuals from an equilibrium model of the real exchange rate. This is
conditional upon specifying the correct equilibrium model.-14-
With financial markets of major industrial countries highly inte-
grated, capital is free to move across different currencies. If
international investors compare risk and return characteristics of
assets, so that they exhibit risk-aversion, equilibrium exchange rates
will be influenced by portfolio considerations.11 Take a simplified
setting in which the change in the equilibrium real exchange rate can be
expressed as a function of the accumulation of foreign currency deposits
by the U.S. residents (current account) and of the relative monetary and
growth conditions in the U.S. and abroad (velocity). An empirical
application of this equilibrium model over the floating period shows
that, on average, a unit fall in the normalized relative current account
surplus of the U.S. induces a depreciation of real effective exchange
rate of the dollar by one fourth whereas the average effect of a fall in
velocity is a one-to-one real depreciation.12 Changes in fundamentals
explain 40 per cent of the actual volatility of the real exchange rate.
The difference between actual changes and equilibrium changes is
then used as a proxy for "news". The explanation of the changes in the
nominal exchange rate also includes the arbitrage variables: relative
inflation rates and changes in real interest differentials. A special
effect due to the change in the U.S. Administration is allowed for. All
variables except the "news" become insignificant and the regression
13 explains over 60 per cent of the variance of the nominal exchange rate.
The importance of "news" shows the difficulty in anticipating
exchange rates changes. This also reduces the ability of central banks
to dampen volatility by intervention. Bearing in mind the simplicity of
the estimation methods used, the results confirm the advantage of relying
on a portfolio equilibrium framework rather than exclusively on arbitrage—15—
conditions. Since it only allows forcurrency diversification, this
simplified equilibrium model cannot capture the U.S. fiscal-monetary mix
after 1982. Renewed expectations of a fiscal deficitraising U.S. real
interest rates are required.for the equilibrium realexchange rate to
continue appreciating in spite of a widening current account deficit.-16-
II. PACIFIC TRADEANDFINANCIAL INTERDEPENDENCE
Rather than attempting to estimate the measures of trade and
financial interdependence emphasized earlier, we assess interdependence
among the middle-income countries of the Pacific area by an investigation
of their exchange rate regime, an analysis of regional trade patterns,
and an overview of trade in relative prices -asmeasured by
trade—weighted effective exchange rates deflated by relative consumer
prices (subsection 1). It will become apparent that trade and financial
interdependence is channeled through the two entrepots of the region,
Singapore and Hong-Kong. Furthermore, the analysis of Section 1.1 is
relevant to Singapore and Malaysia, where most of the ingredients of
trade and financial interdependence can be found (subsection 2).
Nevertheless, as stated in the conclusion, trade and financial
interdependence in the middle-income countries of the Pacific as a group
is still quite low by North Atlantic standards.
1. Exchange rate regimes in Pacific middle-income countries
As mentioned, both the nominal and the real effective exchange rates
of the U.S. dollar depreciated from 1977 to 1980 and appreciated since
then. This remarkable medium-term swing followed a period of relative
stability with a mild depreciation in 1975. As a rule, the Pacific
middle-income countries followed this pattern closely. Except for 1983,
when they let the dollar appreciate in nominal and real terms, the
trade-weighted exchange rates of most Pacific middle-income countries
have depreciated and appreciated with the dollar, in what may be called—17—
an exchange rate policy of "benign neglect". Whilea distinction can be
made between "peggers" and "floaters", it doesnot necessarily coincide
with the official exchange rateregime, as described, say, in the Fund's
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions.
Indeed, no country is explicitly pegged to the U.S. dollar.Rather
the peg is an undisclosed basket oftrading partners' currencies. On the
other side, the two floaters, Malaysia andSingapore, are to a large
extent bilaterally pegged despite the absence ofa formal commitment to
that effect.
Consider the five (unofficial) dollarpeggers. During 1975-82,
their effective exchange rates followed thedollar's, with some
anticipating it. Thus Philippines and Korea deprecitaed in 1976and
1982, while Indonesia and Thailand appreciated in 1979and the
Philippines in 1980. Changes in effectiveexchange rates were also
brought about by discrete devaluations against the dollar.This was the
case in 1983 for Indonesia and Philippines (bothby about 150%), in 1982
for Taiwan (13%), in 1981 for Thailand andTaiwan (38% and 17%
respectively), in 1980 for Korea (about 120%), in 1978 for Indonesia
(200%), in 1975 for the Philippines (30%) and in 1974for Korea (85%).
Singapore and Malaysia also let their currenciesdepreciate against the
dollar in 1975, by 50% and 30%respectively.
Since these devaluations are notsynchronized, the correlation
between the (end-of-period) dollar rates of thepeggers is very weak over
the period from the second quarter of 1973 to thesecond quarter of 1984.
Indeed, the only value higher than .5 is between Thailand andTaiwan. In
contrast, among the main industrial partners of the United Statesexcept
Canada the correlation among dollar rates isgenerally higher than .5-18—
(the only lower values are .4, between Japan and the United Kingdom and
Italy). The correlation of the dollar rates of the Pacific peggers with
the yen-dollar rate is also quite weak, the highest being Taiwan (.32).
The two joint floaters, however, exhibit a correlation of about .9
between themselves and also with the mark-dollar rate. The correlation
with the yen-dollar rate is about .5, slightly lower than the one between
the yen-dollar and the mark-dollar rates. Table 1 shows the variability
of the Pacific peggers relative to the floaters and to the currencies
used in the computation of the effective rate of the dollar described
above. Despite the crude measures used, it is clear that variability is
lowest for the dollar peggers.
To analyse the trends in trade-weighted exchange rates, some
indication of trade shares and elasticities is needed. Since trade
elasticity estimates discriminating between the imports of various
origins are not easily available, the network of trade interdependence
has to rely on measures of average openness.14 But, in the model of
Section 1.1, a large multiplier or a high elasticity substantially
increases the degree of trade interdependence and leads to a strong
negative feedback of monetary policy. A merchandise trade matrix, while
it neglects invisibles and smuggling, provides a rough approximation to
the trade channel of structural interdependence. In Table 2, the Pacific
middle-income countries are arranged as the four NICs and the so-called
New NICs which include ASEAN countries less Singapore. To make the role
of the overlapping country more apparent, shares less than 1.5% were set
to zero. As a consequence, rows and columns do not add up to the numbers
reported under total. The last row and column refer to the share of the
country's trade accounted for by other Pacific middle-income countries.—18a—
Table 1
Volatility of Dollar Exchange Rates (%p.a.)
Mean Coefficient Range
Major currencies of variation
Canada 2.6 3 38
France 6.3 4 100
Germany 0.6 42 113
Italy 10.3 2 118
Japan -0.4 53 100
United Kingdom 6.1 3 94
Pacific Floaters
Malaysia -0.4 31 72
Singapore -1.2 10 66
Pacific Peggers
Indonesia 9.4 4 204
Korea 6.6 3 87
Philippines 9.4 3 117
Thailand 0.9 7 49
Taiwan 0.4 12 38
Note: Exchange rates defined as U.S. dollars per unit of currency of
country in stub at end of quarter from 1973;2 to 1984;2 (positive number
indicates depreciation relative to the dollar).
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics

































Note: *lessthan $260 million (1.5% of total).









Total 7 7 19 30 15 7 6 9 100
% World 9 7 20 31 33 17 15 22-19-
The largest values are for Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, even though
Thailand on the export side and Hong Kong on the import side are also
above the average of 19%.
Using the set of trade weights reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2,
nominal and effective exchange rates for our seven Pacific countries were
computed (see Appendix Tables 3-9). The real rates presented are very
crude proxies for relative traded goods prices due to the existence of
several export incentives, but they give an idea of the evolution of the
purchasing power of the domestic currency over a foreign basket of goods
15 in relation to a domestic one. We will focus on their annual average
value using import weights. These tend to overstate the weight of the
United States and Japan because the European Community is not aggregated.
Better estimates of the weights of the EC are thus reported in the last
row. Similarly, trade of Singapore and Indonesia is not reflected in the
table. Using the Indonesia export shares from Table 2, the ttothertt
category is as reported in parentheses in Appendix Table 1. This figure
was used to compute a set of import weights for Singapore which may be a
better approximation to reality.
According to Table 3, the nominal effective exchange rate of the
dollar peggers did not on average change by more under floating than it
had during most of the Bretton-Woods period. The opposite is true of the
floaters. Again, a decline in the absolute value of the mean rate of
change from the fixed to the flexible rate period is evident in virtually
all countries. The exception is the rate of Singapore when some imports
from Indonesia are allowed for. There is a real appreciation instead of
a depreciation and its magnitude increases with the sharp devaluations of—19a'-
Table3




mean mean coefficient of
variation
1958-72 '73-83 '58-72 '73-83 '58—72 '73-8
Singapore -0.2 -1.1 1.5 0.2 1 50
SGa -1.3-2.4 -1.0-3.5 5 3
Malaysia -0.0-0.8 2.4 1.0 1 5
Indonesia 9.4 10.3 h 0.8 1 17
Thailand 0.6 2.6 1.9 0.7 2 8
Philippines 10.9 6.3 8.2 1.8 3 5
Korea 17.6 8.1 8.8 1.9 3 4
Taiwan 2.4 1.4 1.3 -0.5 20 21
Notes: Weights as in Appendix table 1.
a: Includes imports from Indonesia.
h: Due to the hyperinflation of the early sixties, comparable
figures are not available.
Sources: Consumer prices from line 64 of IFS and FS (for Taiwan).-20—
the Indonesian currency since 1978. The coefficients of variation
(standard deviation over mean) convey the same message.
We observed in Section 1.2 that the nominal and real effective
exchange rates of the US dollar (using multilateral weights) were almost
perfectly correlated during the floating rate period. This is not the
case in the Pacific middle-income countries, as seen in Table 4: the
higher correlation, .9, is for Indonesia, where the policy was one of
sharp nominaldevaluations. Interestingly, over the longer period,
Philippines and Korea are the ones closer to relative purchasing power
parity (1 and .9 respectively from 1958 to 1983). Relative inflation
rates are very weakly correlated with nominal exchange rate changes. The
correlation is higher with real exchange rates precisely because of the
lower variability of nominal exchange rates: the lowest values are for
devaluation-prone Indonesia and Korea)6
The cross-country correlations shown in Table 5 confirm the pattern
of dollar rates discussed above: low correlations of nominal and real
effective rates for most pairs of countries. Taiwan does display high
real correlation with Philippines and Thailand, and the same is true
between the two joint floaters, to which we now turn.
2. The Malayan joint float
The development of Singapore as an entrepot for international trade
and finance has been a major factor in the trade and financial
interdependence of the middle income countries of the Pacific. The
economic proximity to Malaysia --withwhich it once was federated --has
also been noted. It is possible to recast the policy games of Section-20a—
Table4
Prices and Import-Weighted Exchange Rates:
Correlations
Nominal and Nominal EER Real EER
Real Effective and Relative and Relative
Exchange Rates Consumer Prices (P*/P) Consumer Prices
1958—72 '73-83 '58-72 '73—83 '58—72 '73-83
Singapore .7 .7 .5 .8 1.0
SGa 1.0 .8 .9 .6 1.0 1.0
Malaysia .5 .8 .2 .9 .6
Indonesia h .9 h -.2 h .1
Thailand .5 .6 -.2 -.1 .8 .7
Philippines 1.0 .8 -.3 * -.2 .6
Korea 1.0 .6 -.3 -.4 * 5
Taiwan .6 .6 -.2 .3 .6 .9
•*less than .05 in absolute value
Annual average changes, statistics rounded to nearest decimal.
Sources: Same as table 3.Numbers refer to percentage changes in annual averages of nominal effective exchange
rates (real in parentheses) rounded to nearest digit.










PL .6 (.4) .1(.4) .2 (.4)-.2(.3) .
TL .2 (.2) .4(.5) .2(.3) .1).3) .2(.7)
KR—.2 (—.1) .3(.1) .2 (—.2)*(—.1) .2(.6) .2(.5)
TW .2 (.4) .6(.4) .6 (.4) .3(.3) .5(.8) .8(.9) .2 (.5)
*Less than .05 in absolute value-21-
1.1 in a broader set-up which allows two small countries to act on their
money stocks given domestic shocks and the outcome of the policy game of
large countries, as captured by their bilateral exchange rate.17 If
there are no differences in the trade pattern of the small countries with
the large ones, the bilateral rate of the small countries will be fixed
unless one of them acts as a leader. Otherwise, the bilateral rate of
the small countries may move in the cooperative solution.
If the most relevant policy game of industrial countries is between
the United States and Japan, trade patterns of Malaysia and Singapore are
roughly symmetric. If, instead, the game is between the United States
and Europe, Malaysia would be more sensitive to European shocks, given
the weights in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
Even in the case of a symmetric sensitivity the bilateral rate
between Malaysia and Singapore could move if one of the countries acted
as a leader. Due to its role as a financial center, Singapore may have
performed that role in the early eighties, thereby allowing Malaysia to
be less contractionary. Needless to say, a Malayan cooperative agreement
would be less contractionary still.'8
Recalling that interest rate movements are an important channel of
policy interdependence, we report some evidence on the deposit rate
differentials between Singapore and Malaysia in Table 6.' While annual
averages hide a lot of information and should be used with caution, the
volatility of expectations about the world value of the U.S. dollar can
certainly account for the observed variations in the realized real
interest, differential. It seems therefore consistent with the
expectation of a Malayan joint float.20—21a—
Table 6
Realized Interest Rate Differentials
Between Singapore and Malaysia
(°hpa.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
3 mo. deposit consumer real
rate (period average) prices differential
SG ML SG ML(+ in favor of SG)
1975 4.3 5.7 3.3 5.1 0.4
1976 3.8 5.0 -2.4 2.4 3.6
1977 4.5 5.0 3.3 4.8 1.0
1978 5.3 5.0 4.7 4.5 0.1
1979 7.2 6.2 4.5 3.6 0.1
1980 11.2 8.8 7.9 7.0 1.5
1981 7.4 10.5 8.7 9.8 -2.0
1982 6.2 10.5 3.7 6.0 -2.0
1983 6.5 8.8 1.2 3.4 -0.1
Sources: (1) Lee (1984), Table 2.5, p. 43.
(2) Bank Negara (1984), p. 464, p. 968; end-of-period
averaged using quarterly averages of interbank rates.




Over the last ten years, flexible exchange rates among industrial
countries generated an erratic pattern, in relative prices and made basic
signals of resource allocation very noisy. Growth declined worldwide,
but mostly in industrial countries. In the Pacific area, exchange rates
were not as volatile and growth continued. Policy interdependence under
flexible exchange rates may thus be partly responsible for the slowdown
of growth.
Due to the erratic pattern of real exchange rates, it is very
difficult to assess, let alone correct, the misalignment of the major
world currencies. The preferred explanation of exchange rate volatility
stressed changes in the fundamental determinants of the real exchange
rate, identified as monetary velocities and current accounts. National
governments can stabilize expectations about fundamentals by designing
credible macroeconomic policies. The overwhelming influence of "news"
and the size of world financial markets relative to central bank reserves
strains the credibility of uncoordinated intervention in the foreign
exchange market.
The realization that, even when the analysis is restricted to major
industrial countries, intervention in foreign exchange markets cannot
reduce volatility, has generated proposals designed to lessen trade and
financial interdependence among the major industrial countries. The
large size and efficient organization of the foreign exchange market
makes the effectiveness of trade and exchange restrictions temporary at
best.-23-
An international monetary system where greater stability in exchange
rates could again be expected requires a credible commitment to
coordinated macroeconomic policies, and therefore the existence of
incentives for policy coordination. Given the contractionary bias of the
flexible exchange rate system, additional monetary expansion in the U.S.
and other industrial countries could rekindle inflationary expectations
and hurt the ongoing recovery.
In the absence of incentives for coordination among industrial
countries, higher trade and financial interdependence among the
middle-income countries of the Pacific could help preserve the growth
potential of the region. The widespread policy of pegging to the U.S.
dollar, while making exchange rates less volatile, has often been
accompanied by sharp devaluation against the nuineraire. An alternative,
which requires higher Pacific interdependence than the one prevailing
during the last decade, would be a joint float along the lines of the
policies seemingly pursued by Malaysia and Singapore. To manage this
float, monetary policy would adjust to accomodate changes in
import-weighted exchange rates such as the ones presented in this paper.
As financial interdependence increases, the indicators for the change in
this basket peg become the fundamental determinants of the equilibrium
real exchange rate, as discussed in connection with the world value of
the dollar.-24-
NOTES
1.Branson (1984) classifies the Pacific middle-income countries into
Asian NICs (Hong-Kong, Korea and Singapore) and new NICs (Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). He includes India as a low-
income NIC, and so does Aghevli (1981). We exclude India,
include Taiwan (the fourth Asian NIC) and make passing reference to
Hong-Kong.
2.The interaction of internal and external coordination weakens
the case for cooperation among central banks, as recently shown
by Rogoff (1983). We do not incorporate these issues in the
analysis, even though they are important ingredients of the
skepticism about the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies
mentioned at the outset. In fact, when the incentive of central
banks to inflate is somehow ruled out, the presumption for
cooperation re-emerges. We thus come back to the direct link
between the lack of credibility of macroeconomic policies and
the volatility of expectations.
3. The debate between economists and political scientists is discussed
in Cooper (1984). Bressand (1982) claims that "economic security"
has been declining, an idea close to the vulnerability -
interdependenceput forth by political scientists but also
consistent with the volatility of expectations stressed below in the
text.
4.For example, consider a world economy composed of two identical
countries where prices are fixed. If the (common) marginal
propensity to save is 10%, we know that a unit increase in world
autonomous expenditure will increase world output by ten. Assume-25-
now a marginal propensity to import of one half in both countries. A
unit increase in expenditure in one of them will increase domestic
output by a multiplier of 5.5 and foreign output by a multiplier of
4.5. If the marginal propensities to import increase to 75%,
however, the domestic effect will decrease to 53% of the world
output increase of ten units and the foreign effect will increase to
47%. Higher propensities would of course reduce the multiplier.
5. See Feldstein (1983).
6. Simple game-theoretic macro models are in Hamada (1979) and
Canzoneri and Gray (1983). Also Macedo (1984b) and references
therein.
7.The point is made by Cooper (1984).
8.A trade-weighted index, such as the one used in Section II for Asian
countries, would tend to be more stable in the case of the U.S.
because it assigns a large weight to a low-variance currency, the
Canadian dollar. From 1973 to 1979, for example, the bilateral
index depreciated by slightly over one half of the multilateral
index (5.4% vs. 8.6% p.a.).
9. See Frenkel (1984).
10. Then a positive interest rate differential in favor of the home
country can sustain an overvaluation which will be larger the higher
the probability of the crash. For example, if this probability is
as high as ,anannualized interest differential of 5% will support
an overevaluation of 10% per annum. A similar problem (which has
received more attention in the exchange rate literature) is called
"peso problem't and refers to the effect of an expected change in
policy on the current exchange rate, thus increasing its volaitlity-26-
as well as the volatility of the real exchange rate. Finally, the
exchange rate might move "too much" because of fads or extraneous
beliefs. To the extent that these are autocorrelated, the forecast
error will be difficult to detect empirically. See further
discussion in Dornbusch (1982) and references therein.
11. For an exposition of the so-called "portfolio view" see Tobin
and Macedo (1981). Tobin (1982) notes, however, that the
question of whether the volatility of asset prices leads to
increasing divergence from the path of their fundamental
determinants has not been as actively researched in the context of
exchange rates as in the context of stock market prices.
12. The normalized relative current account goes from a U.S. surplus
until end-1976 to a substantial relative U.S. deficit in 1977-79,
a surplus in 1980-81 and a deficit in 1982. Thus, before 1982,
relative deficits in the U.S. coincided with the depreciating
dollar. We can also identify a period of increasing U.S. velocity
through 1978 (even though velocity had decreased in 1977),
followed by a steep ascent in 1979 and again following the second
quarter of 1981. See Macedo (1983a).
13. See Macedo (1983a) for a description of the theoretical model used
in the estimation and for econometric results.
14. This is also true of the measure of trade interdependence used by
Lin (1984).
15. See Macedo (1981) for an interpretation of the real exchange rate
along these lines.
16. This point was noted by Aghevli (1981) for the period of the weak-27-
dollar, 1973-78.
17. The model is in Macedo (1984a).
18. Essential differences with theCurrency Board experience are of
course monetary sovereignty and "generalized floating". See Bank
Negara (1984, p. 31). Nevertheless, the tradition of the Straits
dollar or the Malayan dollar cannot be altogetherignored. Lin
(1984, p. 30) mentions a "striking" "closerelationship
throughout the period 1965-82".
19. Khan (1980) warns of the possiblyimportant role of interest rates
in the money demand functions of Southeast Asiancountries. Lin
(1984, p. 27) gives lending rates in these countries forselected
years and notes their lack of simultaneity.
20. Whether it is joint or not, the float ofthe Singapore currency
will certainly be managed, to an extent that makesit difficult to
distinguish from a (passive) crawlingpeg. Branson (1981) proposed
an import-weighted basket adjusted with roughlyequal weights to
current account and reserve targets. As in the model of Section
1.1, monetary policy adjusts to accomodate thatexchange rate.
Higher financial interdependence would make the indicatorsclose to
the fundamental determinants in the model ofSection 1.2.—28—
APPENDIX
A TWO-COUNTRY MODEL OF POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE
1.The analysis of policy interdependence described in the text is based
on a conventional two-country macro model, with several features borrowed
from Kouri and Macedo (1978). We use a log-linear formulation, where
variables are measured relative to their steady-state values. The two IS
curves are given by:
(1) yaO_btr_b"r*
(2) y*_aO_bf'r_btr*
where y (y*) is (the log of) domestic (foreign) real output
r (r*) is the domestic (foreign) real interest rate
0 =e+w*-wis the (log of the) real exchange rate
e is the (log of the) domestic currency price of foreign
currency
w (w*) is (the log of) the price of domestic (foreign) goods
a is the elasticity of oulput relative to the real exchange
rate
b' (b") is the intertemporal substitution semi—elasticity
relative to the domestic (foreign) real interest rate—29—
As shown in Macedo (1983), equations (1) and (2) are derived from
the open-economy income identity in the two countries, where domestic
absorption is a function of domestic output and (through investment) of
the domestic real interest rate and the current account isa function of
domestic and foreign outputs and the terms of trade (inverse of the real
exchange rate). Thus the parameter a is given by the average propensity
to import evaluated at the steady-state, theopen-economy multiplier with
repercussion and the sum of the trade elasticities subtracted from one.
Similarly, the parameter b' is given by the investment share in output
evaluated at the steady-state, the multiplier and the real interest
elasticity of domestic investment divided by the real domestic interest
rate. The parameter b" is given by the share of the domesticcurrency
value of investment abroad in domestic output times the multiplier times
the foreign elasticity divided by the foreign real rate. Toillustrate,
suppose the values for the savings and import propensities are,
respectively, .1 and .5, so that the multipliers of domestic and foreign
expenditure are like in note 3 in the text. They are now to be applied
to changes in domestic investment induced by changes in the domestic and
foreign real interest rates, Domestic and foreign investment as shares
of domestic output are 20% and interest elasticities are .1 at home and
abroad. Then, at interest-rates of 10%, the semi-elasticities of
aggregate demand will be b' =1.1and b" =.9.Under these conditions,
the foreign trade multiplier will be .9. If theaverage propensity tQ
import is also 20% and the trade elasticities are unity, we will get a
.18.—30—
The two LN curves are given by:
(3) m-p=(y+w-p)-ci
(4) m* -p*=(y*+w-p*)-ci*
where m (m*) is the (log of the) domestic (foreign) money
stock;
4(4*' 4 -l-. mi4t .rm4r,l 4ntv.F '.- / '."b'/
p(p*) is the domestic (foreign) price levels;
is the income elasticity of money demand
and c is the interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
Equations (3) and (4) are obtained from a variable-velocity money
demand function, where the level of the exchange rate enters through the
price index used to deflate money balances and transactions demand is a
function of national income rather than output. Also, exchange rate
depreciation raises money demand by less, unlike the one-to-one effect
implied by purchasing power parity, but the size is given by the share of
the foreign good in consumption rather than by the share of foreign
assets in wealth. This is clear from the definition of the price
indices.
(3')
(4') p* =(1-*)w*+* (w-e)=w*-
Priceand exchange rate expectations are introduced by three crucial




While there is substantial evidence against the risk-neutral
behavior underlying (5), we use it to keep the model tractable. On the
other hand, nominal interest rates are deflated by the price index used
to deflate nominal money balances, so that terms of trade changes also
have a less than one-to-one effect on the real interest differential.
Taking as a benchmark the case where we see that, if consumption is
biased toward the domestic good (13<½), a faster real depreciation will
raise the real interest rate differential:
(8) r =r*+ (1 -2)O
This is the channel through which changes in the real exchange rate
have an effect on relative outputs, with sign dependingon the
consumption bias. Subtracting (2) from (1) and using (8), we can express
the cyclical position of the two countries in terms of the realexchange
rate and its rate of change:
(9) y -y*=2a0-(b'-b")(l-2)O
On the other hand, subtracting (4) from (3) and using (5), we see
that the nominal exchange rate will change so as to offset changes in the
relative velocities Df money. These can be expressed in terms of
relative real money balances (deflated by domestic prices), the real
exchange rate and the cyclical position of the two countries:—32—
(10) =- -- 2(1-- (y-y*)J;
wherem m-w
and rn*m*_w*
Suppose that the prices of domestic output are exogenously fixed at
w =w=. Then0 =eand the dynamics of the system reduce to:
(11) [c +(b'-b")(i-2)}=2[a+(1-)]e-(m-m*)




Therole of the parameter hinges on the existence of a terms of
trade effect on money demand and it vanishes when C= 1.





Asimilar expression holds for foreign output. While the effect of
own expansionary monetary policy is always positive, the effect of
depreciation -and,via (12), of contractionary monetary policy abroad -
ondomestic output will hinge on the relative size ofp and .Alow
interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand, oran income elasticity of—33...
money demand equal to or larger than unity imply p > ,andthe effect
will be positive.
For concreteness, suppose that the nominal interest-elasticity of
money demand is .1. Then, at nominal interest rates of 10%, the
semi-elasticity of money demand will be one. Using the values indicated
earlier, we get b' + b" =2,so that the ratio will be p =.5.Note
that, as long as there is no expected inflation, the level of interest
rates cancels, so that p would not decrease at higher interest rates. On
the other hand, a nominal elasticity of .4 will makep =2.
Suppose now that the share of foreign goods in the consumer price
index and the income elasticity are both one half. Then we will have
=1.4so that it will be less than p. If the trade elasticities
double, we get=.46,less than the first value of p. With Unit trade
elasticities and =.82,we get .5, so that it exactly equals p.
2.To analyze strategic behavior in response to the fixed pricew,
it is convenient to work with the realmoney stocks in both countries,
e.g., in= m-. Wewill henceforth drop the bar from the real money
stocks, to avoid cluttering. Substituting (12) into (13) and (3'), we





2(C + + p)
andV =Ja
2( +
Note that 1 > i > i* and that p > v > 0 while the sign of p' hinges
on the relative size of p and .Whenp* > 0, we will have p* > V
as long as <a,since the condition p >(/a)/(1-n/a)is then weaker
than p >. Theexpressions for foreign output and the foreign price
level are like (14) and (15), with the instruments reversed.
Suppose now the monetary authorities in both countries wish to
minimize a quadratic loss function expressed in terms ofy and p, the
deviation of output and the consumer price index from their steady-state
values:
(16) Ly2+qp2
where q is the weight attached to the price objective.
We will focus here on the case where p* >0,so that an expansionary
monetary policy abroad creates unemployment at home. We can see from
equations (14) and (15) that, if both countries jointly set m = 0,
that is, if they increase their money stock in proportion to the given
change in the price of their domestic output, then y =y'=0
and p =p*=w.This cooperative solution yields a loss given by:
(17) CLCL* =
Eachcountry may try to increase the money stock by less, however,
in order to appreciate its currency and reduce inflation. If both try to—35—
do so, in the mistaken belief that the other country does not react
against the correpsonding depreciation, we will have a non-cooperative
solution. To characterize it, substitute from (14) and (15) into (16),
to obtain the loss function in terms of the instruments. It defines the
loss contours as the ellipses shown by broken lines in Figure 1 in the
text. Then differentiate totally and set to zero, to yield:
(18) gm -g*m*+flvw+(m*-g*m-rlvw) 0
(18') gm*_ g*m +IJvT + (m-g*m*-rvw)dm*0
whereg 1J2+rlv2
.2 2 g = + nv
andg* = + fly2
To find the Cournot-Nash solution, set both conjectural variations
to zero, to yield:
(19) gm -g*m*=-rvw
(19') gm* -g*m=-nv;
Solving,the Cournot-Nash solution is again given by equal money




Substitutingfrom (19) into (14) and (15), and then into (16), we
get the (common) loss as. Using (17), we express it as a proportion of
the ooperative solution:
(21) NL =[i+q(v/p)2]CL—36—
If the home country assumes that the foreign country will play the
non-cooperative solution just described and minimizes loss subject to the
other country's Cournot reaction function, then, if this assumption is
correct, we will have a Stackelberger solution, where the conjectural
variations will be dm*/dm* =g*/gand dm/dm* =0.
Using these results in (18) and (18'), we get a real money stock
that is higher than at N, even though it is still negative:
S S*.,.N
(22) mm= mA
S. S*N (22) m' mmA"
2• whereA =(g-gg)/
2 A" (g -2g"+gg")/
and =g(g+g")-g"[(g -g)/(g-gn)J
It can be shown that 1 >A*>A,so that the Stackelberger solution
is less contractionary than the Nash, and less contractionary for the
follower than for the leader.
Finally, the locus of efficient points is given by the tangency of
the loss contours. Equating the slopes from (18) and (18'),we get:
(23) g*(m2 +m*2) (g +) rpm*-qv(m+m*)=0
This is an hyperbola going through the origin and through the
intersection of the axes and the Cournot reaction functions, as shown by
the dotted line in Figure 1 in the text.
Consider now the case where p* <0.As shown in the second
numerical example given earlier, it requires a low elasticity ofmoney
demand. It is clear from (20) that the size of the contractionary bias—37—
is smaller in that case but, as seen in (21), this does not affect loss
in the Cournot-Nash solution.
From the definition of g* after (18), we see that, in order for g* <
0,given that p* <0,it is also necessary that the weight on the price




Note that the bias in the Stackelberger solution becomes smaller for
the leader if condition (24) is satisfied because in that case A >A*.
Also, the numerical example would give g* <0if r< 1.This case can be
illustrated in Figure 1, with downward sloping reaction functions.—38—
Appendix Table 1
1980 Import Weights
SG(SGa) ML ID TL PL KR TW
Singapore
- 12 9 6 ** *
Malaysia 14 - ** ** *
Indonesia *(ll) * -* ** *
Japan 18 23 13 21 20 26 28
Australia * 5 5 ** **
United States 14 15 31 14 24 22 22
Saudi Arabia 12 6 9 9 10 15 8
Germany * 5 6 4 4* 3
United Kingdom * 5 * * ** *
Other 42(31)29 32 46 42 37 39
Memo: EC9 11 20 13 9 12 13 8
Note: *neglected.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade,
Trade Statistics of the Republic of China (for Taiwan).
Memo item: Singapore from Wong (1984)
Malaysia from Lim (1984), Western Europe, average 1975-80
Indonesia from Beals (1984)
Thailand from Ajanant (1984)
Philippines: U.K. and Germany only
Korea: Germany, U.K. and France only
Taiwan from Schive (1984)—39—
Appendix Table 2
1980 Export Weights
SG ML ID TL PL KR TW
Singapore — 19 11 8 * *
Malaysia 15 - * * * * *
Thailand 4 * * - * * *
Japan 8 23 20 15 17 17 11
Australia 4 * * * *
UnitedStates 13 16 49 13 28 26 36
Saudi Arabia* * * * * 5 3
Germany * * 4 4 5 4
Netherlands * * 13 6 *
UnitedKingdom * * * * 3
OTHER 56 36 20 47 35 44 46
Memo EC9 12 20 6 19 12 13 13
Note: neglected.





Export Import Export Import
1958 .302 .303 2800.5 2973.2
1959 .302 .303 2493.0 2657.0
1960 .302 .296 2133.7 2209.3
1961 .302 .297 1132.5 1174.6
1962 .302 .297 462.0 475.8
1963 .302 .297 212.8 217.0
1964 .302 .297 92.9 94.8
1965 .302 .297 14.0 14.2
1966 .302 .297 2.4 2.4
1967 .302 .297 .721 .924
1968 .589 .580 .820 .816
1969 .640 .631 .807 .803
1970 .717 .711 .853 .846
1971 .787 .781 .942 .931
1972 .917 .906 1.071 1.054
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .957 .976 .822 .831
1975 .951 .978 .754 .785
1976 .946 .970 .669 .710
1977 1.007 1.025 .686 .723
1978 1.259 1.255 .831 .851
1979 1.742 1.764 .995 1.028
1980 1.720 1.755 .907 .934
1981 1.766 1.754 .885 .883
1982 1.713 1.719 .813 .819





Export Import Export Import
1958 .112 .111 .346 .335
1959 .112 .111 .339 .329
1960 .140 .136 .393 .373
1961 .281 .272 .749 .713
1962 .286 .277 .738 .702
1963 .286 .277 .637 .608
1964 .471 .456 .828 .794
1965 .586 .568 .937 .899
1966 .598 .579 .884 .845
1967 .595 .577 .818 .785
1968 .604 .590 .778 .750
1969 .630 .615 .759 .735
1970 .683 .662 .749 .717
1971 .777 .752 .789 .752
1972 .931 .918 .881 .852
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .988 .985 .920 .944
1975 1.190 1.185 .998 1.050
1976 1.174 1.185 .934 1.026
1977 1.216 1.235 .946 1.051
1978 1.338 1.379 .957 1.066
1979 1.341 1.360 .871 .938
1980 1.677 1.686 .935 .985
1981 1.843 1.905 .911 .974
1982 1.878 1.939 .906 .957





Export Import Export Import
1958 1.030 1.058 .721 .744
1959 1.030 1.058 .742 .769
1960 1.030 1.042 .756 .772
1961 1.034 1.045 .777 .798
1962 1.035 1.046 .801 .821
1963 1.035 1.046 .808 .824
1964 1.035 1.046 .831 .848
1965 1.035 1.046 .860 .876
1966 1.035 1.046 .883 897
1967 1.035 1.045 .874 .886
1968 1.035 1.034 .906 .907
1969 1.035 1.035 .945 .949
1970 1.035 1.041 .970 .981
1971 1.048 1.054 1.011 1.027
1972 1.051 1.052 1.019 1.033
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .965 .966 .976 .974
1975 .970 .957 1.018 1.036
1976 1.010 .984 1.098 1.128
1977 1.025 .982 1.113 1.158
1978 1.086 1.034 1.180 1.218
1979 1.032 .984 1.145 1.190
1980 1.020 .981 1.160 1.217
1981 1.072 1.021 1.193 1.238
1982 1.030 .967 1.129 1.162





Export Import Export Import
1958 .248 .259 .335 .367
1959 .248 .259 .342 .377
1960 .250 .253 .339 .359
1961 .252 .255 .347 .368
1962 .479 .483 .643 .677
1963 .489 .493 .649 .678
1964 .489 .493 .617 .643
1965 .489 .493 .627 .648
1966 .488 .492 .616 .631
1967 .488 .492 .599 .612
1968 .488 .492 .612 .622
1969 .488 .492 .632 .642
1970 .743 .750 .897 .903
1971 .825 .828 .911 .908
1972 .920 .921 .965 .953
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .981 .989 .851 .867
1975 1.051 1.056 .929 .975
1976 1.073 1.082 .972 1.042
1977 1.126 1.121 .997 1.077
1978 1.266 1.234 1.098 1.151
1979 1.264 1.229 .986 1.025
1980 1.271 1.240 .925 .959
1981 1.303 1.232 .900 .942
1982 1.325 1.329 .862 .909





Export Import Import a) Export Import Import a)
1958 1.076 1.087 1.304 1.025 .965 1.472
1959 1.075 1.087 1.304 1.017 .972 1.481
1960 1.075 1.045 1.263 1.031 .949 1.452
1t:1 , r_7 -.rslr I I t%1 fl11 1 I.OA LUi 1.U!U 1.V'+ 1.LU.) .L.IJJJ. .,Ih.
1962 1.077 1.045 1.263 1.067 .990 1.502
1963 1.077 1.045 1.263 1.072 1.000 1.508
1964 1.077 1.045 1.263 1.069 1.007 1.515
1965 1.077 1.045 1.263 1.086 1.027 1.539
1966 1.077 1.045 1.263 1.096 1.033 1.541
1967 1.077 1.045 1.263 1.101 1.037 1.539
1968 1.077 1.045 1.134 1.120 1.056 1.259
1969 1.077 1.045 1.119 1.155 1.103 1.272
1970 1.077 1.045 1.099 1.199 1.147 1.267
1971 1.080 1.052 1.091 1.210 1.176 1.258
1972 1.055 1.049 1.065 1.214 1.192 1.231
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .991 .988 .989 .949 .960 .935
1975 .954 .959 .961 .963 1.032 .985
1976 .969 .985 .990 1.056 1.200 1.130
1977 .977 1.011 1.009 1.100 1.283 1.186
197& .975 1.038 1.010 1.113 1.307 1.159
1979 .941 .996 .916 1.102 1.264 .995
1980 .924 .974 .896 1.101 1.233 .958
1981 .894 .952 .877 1.076 1.190 .914
1982 .867 .924 .850 1.062 1.156 .876
1983 .856 .926 .807 1.075 1.173 .796





Export Import Export Import
1958 .837 .788 1.050 .898
1959 .941 .887 1.078 .924
1960 .939 .870 .924 .784
1961 .949 .879 .884 .758
1962 .949 .879 .884 .767
1963 .949 .879 .888 .781
1964 .949 .879 .906 .804
1965 .949 .879 .930 .833
1966 .949 .879 .943 .846
1967 .949 .879 .941 .847
1968 .949 .879 .907 .817
1969 .950 .879 .910 .820
1970 .955 .822 .933 .839
1971 .964 .897 .960 .872
1972 1.004 .972 1.006 .953
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .983 .968 .758 .776
1975 .984 .965 .798 .833
1976 .982 .964 .835 .896
1977 1.008 1.012 .856 .948
1978 1.047 1.115 .891 1.032
1979 1.026 1.071 .856 .956
1980 1.010 1.056 .795 .866
1981 1.023 1.081 .751 .811
1982 1.055 1.080 .789 .818





Export Import Export Import
1958 .812 .859 .647 .695
1959 .819 .866 .692 .748
1960 .820 .840 .712 .745
1961 .826 .838 .681 .714
1962 .821 .831 .671 .703
1963 .819 .829 .696 .728
1964 .818 .828 .722 .752
1965 .818 .828 .750 .774
1966 .818 .828 .751 .767
1967 .818 .828 .745 .762
1968 .818 .828 .758 .773
1969 .819 .829 .775 .789
1970 .824 .834 .816 .831
1971 .841 .848 .875 .879
1972 .913 .921 .949 .946
1973 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1974 .980 .971 .911 .928
1975 .999 .974 .960 .998
1976 .981 .968 .998 1.046
1977 1.037 1.013 1.004 1.092
1978 1.169 1.137 1.101 1.182
1979 1.199 1.140 1.084 1.133
1980 1.197 1.133 .984 1.023
1981 1.196 1.198 .936 1.020
1982 1.188 1.195 .925 1.003
1983 1.182 1.212 .909 1.001—47—
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